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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 






The issue presented in this case is whether the exercise 
by General Motors Corp. ("GM") of its contractual right of 
first refusal violated S 818.9(b)(3) of the Pennsylvania Board 
of Vehicles Act ("the Act"), which prohibits an automobile 
manufacturer from unreasonably withholding its consent to 
the sale of a new vehicle dealer's franchise to a qualified 
buyer. Nicholas Crivelli and Nicholas Crivelli Chevrolet, Inc. 
(collectively Crivelli), the prospective buyer of the 
Oldsmobile-Cadillac dealership at issue, brought this action 
contending that GM violated the Act and intentionally 
interfered with Crivelli's contract to purchase the dealership 
when GM exercised its right of first refusal for the 
dealership, allegedly without any reasonable justification. 






Paul Scheidmantel was the owner and operator of an 
Oldsmobile-Cadillac automobile dealership in Beaver Falls, 
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Pennsylvania since 1987 pursuant to an agreement with 
GM. That agreement required Scheidmantel to provide GM 
with prior written notice of any proposed change or transfer 
of the dealership, required GM's approval for such change, 
and required GM to promptly consider the proposal, which 
it could not "arbitrarily refuse to approve." See Dealer Sales 
& Service Agreement, Art. 12.2. In addition to the provision 
requiring GM's consent to any transfer of the dealership, 
the agreement provided GM with a right of first refusal. The 
only limitation was that GM could not exercise this right if 
the proposed transfer was to a member of the dealer's 
family or to a qualified member of the dealer's management. 
See Dealer Sales & Service Agreement, Art. 12.3.5. 
 
Scheidmantel ran into serious financial trouble and 
decided in 1991 to sell the dealership. On October 2, 1991, 
he entered into an agreement under which Floyd McElwain 
would purchase Scheidmantel's GM dealership along with 
the assets, subject to GM's approval. The McElwain family 
owned and operated McElwain Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc., 
in nearby Ellwood City, and the agreement with 
Scheidmantel contemplated that the Scheidmantel 
dealership would stay in Beaver Falls. Scheidmantel 
informed the local GM zone office, in this case the 
Oldsmobile Zone Office, of the proposed sale. The local GM 
zone office has the responsibility of making the initial 
recommendation with respect to any proposed change in 
dealership. The local zone office forwards its 
recommendation to GM's Retail Organization and 
Development Department in Lansing, Michigan, where the 
proposal and recommendation are considered and afinal 
recommendation made to corporate headquarters. In this 
case, Charles Fisher, the manager of the local zone office, 
recommended to GM headquarters that it approve the 
McElwain-Scheidmantel proposal. 
 
Prior to receiving word from GM headquarters, McElwain 
became concerned over whether Scheidmantel could satisfy 
his creditors, and he rescinded the agreement but offered to 
reinstate it if sufficient guarantees were created. 
Scheidmantel, however, turned to Crivelli, who had 
previously expressed interest in buying the dealership. 
Crivelli and Scheidmantel entered into a buy-sell agreement 
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on November 20, 1991. The agreement was conditioned on 
obtaining the approval of GM and relocation of the 
dealership from Beaver Falls to the more modern facilities 
in nearby Vanport, Pennsylvania that housed Nick Crivelli 
Chevrolet, Inc. 
 
After reviewing the Scheidmantel-Crivelli buy-sell 
agreement, the local zone office manager was concerned 
about the new proposed sale because of Crivelli's plan to 
move the dealership from Beaver Falls, and advised 
Scheidmantel on December 7, 1991 that he would oppose 
the transfer for that reason. The local zone office, interested 
in maintaining the dealership in Beaver Falls, encouraged 
McElwain to reconsider purchasing it and promised that 
GM would exercise its right of first refusal if McElwain 
agreed to buy and run the Beaver Falls dealership. 
Meanwhile, Crivelli, who had been advised of GM's desire 
that the dealership stay in Beaver Falls, agreed not to move 
it out of Beaver Falls. Crivelli mailed notification of its 
concession to GM and to the local zone office on January 
30, 1992 and January 31, 1992 respectively. By then, the 
local zone office had already recommended GM exercise its 
right of first refusal and GM formally advised Scheidmantel 
and Crivelli of its intention to do so on February 6, 1992. 
 
In an internal memorandum dated February 4, 1992, 
David Hartner, the manager of GM's Retail Organization 
and Development Department, explained to his supervisors 
his reasons for exercising the right of first refusal as 
follows: 
 
       It should be noted that the decision to exercise our 
       Right of First Refusal was based on the fact that the 
       proposed buyer, Nick Crivelli Chevrolet had planned to 
       relocate the Oldsmobile and Cadillac Dealership 
       Operation to a different community. That proposal was 
       totally unacceptable to Oldsmobile and Cadillac. They 
       have since modified their agreement wherein the buyer 
       would now plan to stay in Beaver Falls. However, we 
       feel that Floyd McElwain is a superior candidate for us 
       at this location and we plan to proceed with the Right 
       of First Refusal. 
 
JA at 1789. 
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Before any sale was consummated, Scheidmantel's 
creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition on March 
20, 1992, and the disposition of the dealership transferred 
to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. The 
Bankruptcy Court entertained a number of bids for the 
dealership, including a bid from Crivelli and McElwain. The 
Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the dealership to 
McElwain, due in part to GM's approval of that 
arrangement. Crivelli never appealed the Bankruptcy 
Court's order that approved the sale of the dealership to 
McElwain. McElwain opened McElwain's Oldsmobile/ 
Cadillac dealership at the Scheidmantel location in Beaver 
Falls in May, 1992. 
 
Crivelli filed suit against GM in the United States District 
Court for violation of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles 
Act and for tortious interference with a contract, alleging 
GM unreasonably withheld its consent to the sale of the 
dealership when it exercised its right of first refusal. During 
the pretrial proceedings, GM filed a motion for summary 
judgment contending, inter alia, that the Act did not 
preclude its exercise of its right of first refusal. The District 
Court denied the motion. After a lengthy trial, a jury 
determined that GM violated S 818.9 of the Act and 
similarly concluded that GM intentionally and improperly 
interfered with the buy-sell agreement between Crivelli and 
Scheidmantel. The jury awarded compensatory damages of 
$3.5 million in expected lost profits. The District Court 
denied GM's post trial motion and entered judgment for 
Crivelli on the verdict. 
 
GM appeals on four grounds. Its principal claim is that a 
manufacturer's exercise of its right of first refusal does not 
constitute an unreasonable withholding of consent under 
S 818.9 of the Act nor does it constitute tortious 
interference with a contact. In the alternative, GM contends 
that whether a manufacturer's conduct is "unreasonable" 
under the Act should be measured by a good-faith business 
judgment standard and that the District Court erred in 
refusing to grant GM's jury instruction to that effect; that 
the District Court exceeded its discretion by cutting off 
testimony of GM's most important witness; and that GM is 
entitled to a new trial on damages as the award of $3.5 
million is manifestly excessive. 
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We have jurisdiction of the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. To the extent that the appeal raises legal issues, 








The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act 
 
Crivelli relies principally on S 818.9 of the Pennsylvania 
Board of Vehicles Act enacted in 1983 and amended in 
1991 and 1996. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.9(b)(3) (1991) 
(amended 1996). The 1991 version is controlling here. 
Section 818.9 provides that a manufacturer cannot 
unreasonably withhold its consent to the sale, transfer, or 
exchange of a new vehicle dealer franchise. Crivelli argues 
that S 818.9 governed GM's exercise of its right of first 
refusal and that by exercising that right, GM violated the 
Act by unreasonably withholding its consent to 
Scheidmantel's transfer of the dealership to Crivelli. In 
reply, GM argues that the absence of any reference to the 
right of first refusal in the Act as it existed at the relevant 
time, as well as the long-established practice of including 
such rights in dealership agreements, shows that the 
Pennsylvania legislature did not intend S 818.9 to restrict 
the manufacturer's ability to exercise its contractual right 
of first refusal. There is no reported decision from a 
Pennsylvania court on the application of S 818.9 to a right 
of first refusal nor have we or the parties found any helpful 
legislative history as to the Act either before or after its 
amendment in 1996, which added S 818.16 (titled 
"Manufacturer right of first refusal"). 
 
A right of first refusal grants the holder (in this case the 
manufacturer) the option to purchase the grantor's (here 
the dealer) property on the terms and conditions of sale 
contained in a bona fide offer by a third party to purchase 
such property. See Black's Law Dictionary 1325 (6th ed. 
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1990). It has been recognized and given effect by this court, 
see Schultze v. Chevron Oil Co., 579 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 
1978), and others, see, e.g., Prudential Real Estate 
Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR Realty, Inc., 204 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 
2000) (applying California law); Pincus v. Pabst Brewing 
Co., 893 F.2d 1544 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Wisconsin 
law). 
 
The right of first refusal must be distinguished from a 
consent requirement, which requires the dealer (or 
franchisee) to obtain the written approval of the 
manufacturer (or franchisor) prior to the sale of the 
dealership. Both a right of first refusal and a consent 
requirement provide a mechanism by which the franchisor 
can control the selection of its franchisees, but a right of 
first refusal is a less restrictive form of control, as it 
requires that the franchisor match the terms offered for the 
franchise by the third party. See Schultze, 579 F.2d at 780 
(right protects franchisor "without placing a burden" on 
franchisee by "creating two prospective purchasers for every 
offer received by the owner"). 
 
In this case, the agreement between GM and 
Scheidmantel contained both a provision requiring GM's 
consent to a change in ownership or transfer of the  
dealership1 and a provision giving GM a right of first refusal.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 12.2 of the Agreement provided as follows: 
 
       12.2 Other Changes in Ownership or Management  
 
        If Dealer [Scheidmantel] proposes a change in Dealer Operator, a 
       change in ownership, or a transfer of the dealership business or 
its 
       principal assets to any person conditioned upon Division's [GM] 
       entering into a dealer agreement with that person, Division will 
       consider Dealer's proposal and not arbitrarily refuse to approve 
it, 
       subject to the following: 
 
        12.2.1 Dealer agrees to give Division prior wr itten notice of any 
       proposed change or transfer described above. Dealer understands 
       that if any such change is made prior to Division's approval of the 
       proposal, termination of this Agreement will be warranted and 
       Division will have no further obligation to consider Dealer's 
       proposal. 
 
2. Section 12.3.1 of the Agreement provides as follows: 
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While GM agreed not to arbitrarily withhold its consent to 
a proposed sale, it expressly retained the right offirst 
refusal at its sole discretion, so long as it matched the 
purchase price and met the other terms of a bonafide buy- 
sell agreement between the dealer and a third party. It has 
been Crivelli's argument that notwithstanding this provision 
in the contract, GM's exercise of its right of first refusal was 
subject to the "reasonableness" standard ofS 818.9(b)(3) of 
the Act. 
 
The language of the 1991 version of S 818.9, largely 
unchanged from the original 1983 version, provides in part 
that it shall be a violation of the Act for any manufacturer 
to "[u]nreasonably withhold consent to the sale, transfer or 
exchange of the franchise to a qualified buyer capable of 
being licensed as a new vehicle dealer in this 
Commonwealth." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.9(b)(3) (1991) 
(amended in 1996). The statute was amended in 1996 and 
this provision, in essentially the same language, was 
renumbered as S 818.12(b)(3). In order to minimize 
confusion, we will continue to refer to the section as 
S 818.9. 
 
The Pennsylvania statute is one of many enacted in 
various states regulating some aspects of the relationship 
between motor vehicle manufacturers and their franchised 
dealers. The provisions of the statutes vary, as do the 
judicial decisions interpreting them. Their underlying goal, 
similar to that which motivated the state statutes 
regulating the franchise relationship generally, is to protect 
the franchisee who has invested substantial capital in the 
franchise and who is therefore vulnerable to a 
manufacturer who may take advantage of this firm-specific 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       If Dealer submits a proposal for a change of ownership . . ., 
Division 
       will have a right of first refusal to purchase the dealership 
assets 
       regardless of whether the proposed buyer is qualified to be a 
dealer. 
       If Division chooses to exercise this right, it will do so in its 
written 
       response to Dealer's proposal. Division will have a reasonable 
       opportunity to inspect the assets, including real estate, before 
       making its decision. 
 
Dealer Sales & Service Agreement, Art. 12.3.1. 
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investment. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in 
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 
495 A.2d 66, 71 (N.J. 1985), originally a franchise 
relationship was treated as a common law contractual 
relationship, and franchise agreements favored the interests 
of franchisors, particularly with respect to termination. 
"The effects of termination were starkly simple -the 
franchisee would be ousted from the franchise, essentially 
forfeiting his investment. . ." Id. This court has similarly 
remarked, noting "[t]he franchisee's often substantial 
specific investment thus creates an opportunity for post- 
contract opportunistic behavior by the franchisor." New 
Jersey Am., Inc. v. Allied Corp., 875 F.2d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 
1989); see also Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 
142 F.3d 373, 374 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Dealers invest in a 
great deal of firm-specific, or brand-specific, capital, in the 
goods that they carry, and many states have concluded that 
this leaves the dealers vulnerable to opportunistic 
manufacturer behavior . . . ."). 
 
Over time, state legislators, recognizing the 
dissatisfaction with the common-law scheme, "became 
increasingly sensitive to the plight of franchisees who had 
devoted considerable time and money towards building a 
business only to be terminated at the whim of the 
franchisor." Dunkin Donuts, 495 A.2d at 71. As a result, 
many states passed statutes that limited cancellation and 
nonrenewal of a franchise for other than good cause. Id. In 
light of the extensive investment required for an automobile 
dealership, it is not surprising that the Pennsylvania 
legislature followed the national trend and in 1983 enacted 
the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act. Unlike many other 
states, Pennsylvania does not have a statute generally 
applicable to the franchise relationship. Thus, while 
opinions of other state courts interpreting their statutes 
may be informative, we must at all times seek to interpret 
the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act in accordance with 
that state's intent, insofar as we can ascertain it. 
 
The Act (using section numbers in effect in 1991) 
establishes the requirements that govern both the 
continuing relationship between the motor vehicle 
manufacturer and the dealer, see, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
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63, S 818.9, and the ability of the manufacturer to 
unilaterally terminate the franchise or to object to the sale 
of the franchise, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63S 818.9(c). Among 
the provisions that protect the dealer from opportunistic 
behavior by the manufacturer is S 818.18, which restricts a 
manufacturer's ability to approve a dealer entering into an 
existing dealer's market area, and S 818.9(c), which 
precludes a manufacturer from terminating a franchise 
except for "just provocation." Moreover, the manufacturer 
cannot lock a dealer into an unprofitable arrangement by 
unreasonably withholding its consent to the dealer's sale, 
transfer or exchange of the franchise to a qualified buyer 
who can be licensed as a new vehicle dealer. Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 63 S 818.9(b)(3) (1991). 
 
For purposes of considering the interaction between 
S 818.9(b)(3) and the manufacturer's contractual right of 
first refusal, it is significant that until its amendment in 
1996, the Board of Vehicles Act contained no reference at 
all to the right of first refusal. In light of Pennsylvania's 
prior recognition of a right of first refusal, see, e.g., Steuart 
v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982); Warden v. Taylor, 
333 A.2d 922 (Pa. 1975); L.E. Wallach, Inc. v. Toll, 113 A.2d 
258 (Pa. 1955), there is little reason to believe that the 
Pennsylvania legislature intended the Act to effect a marked 
change in prior law. 
 
It would not have been unreasonable for the legislature to 
have decided to maintain the status quo in that connection. 
In the first place, there are legitimate reasons why a 
manufacturer would exercise its right of first refusal. That 
right may protect the manufacturer from being forced into 
a business relationship with a franchisee who it believes 
may not represent it in the manner it desires, may not 
expend sufficient effort to promote its products, and may 
not have the loyalty to it and its business that it believes 
necessary to be an integral part of its operation. 
 
In the second place, a right of first refusal does not entail 
the risks of post-contractual opportunistic behavior by the 
manufacturer that the statutes regulating franchise 
terminations were designated to prevent. See generally 
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521 (1981). A dealer interested 
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in selling its operation is not significantly threatened by the 
manufacturer's exercise of a right of first refusal, so long as 
the dealer receives at least the same compensation as it 
would have received from the prospective buyer. Unlike 
termination or the manufacturer's refusal to consent to the 
sale of the dealership, a right of first refusal does not 
destroy the dealer's ability to recover its investment should 
its relationship with the manufacturer turn sour, should it 
encounter financial difficulties, or should it decide for 
personal reasons to go elsewhere. In most instances, the 
dealer would be largely indifferent to the identity of the new 
owner.3 
 
There have not been many decisions that consider the 
effect of a right of first refusal in a somewhat comparable 
situation. Of the reported opinions on the issue, wefind 
ourselves most persuaded by the reasoning in Hand v. 
Chrysler Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 667 (D. Vt. 1998). In that 
case, Chrysler had a Sales and Service Agreement giving it 
a right of first refusal in the event the dealer decided to sell. 
It exercised its right of first refusal shortly after it was 
notified the dealer had entered into an arrangement to sell 
its assets to the Hands. Chrysler assigned that right to 
Dorset Motor Co., the dealer consented to the assignment, 
and the dealer thereafter sold its assets to Dorset. The 
Hands filed suit against Chrysler alleging, inter alia, that 
Chrysler's exercise of its right of first refusal was an 
unreasonable withholding of consent that violated the 
Vermont Dealers' Act. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment for 
Chrysler. The court held in the first instance that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This may explain why cases that challenge the exercise of the right of 
first refusal are generally brought by the disappointed prospective 
purchaser, rather than the dealer. See, e.g., Blair v. General Motors 
Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Ky. 1993). Although some courts have 
dismissed such cases on lack of standing, see, e.g., Roberts v. General 
Motors Corp., 643 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1994); Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 
591 A.2d 1024 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 362 
(N.J. 1991), and rev'd in part not pertinent here, 604 A.2d 99 (N.J. 
1992), 
in interpreting the Pennsylvania Act, we held that prospective 
purchasers have standing. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1383 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Hands had not established their standing, but that even if 
they had standing, Chrysler would still have been entitled 
to judgment because its exercise of the right offirst refusal 
did not violate the provisions of the Act. The court stated 
that "Chrysler did not prevent [the dealer] from receiving 
fair and reasonable compensation for the value of the 
dealership. [The dealer] received the same price from Dorset 
Motor Company that it would have received from [the 
Hands]." Id. at 673. The similarity of the circumstances in 
the Hand case and the present case is evident. 
 
In language equally applicable here, the Hand  court 
stated: 
 
       Chrysler also properly exercised its right of first refusal 
       and had no obligation to honor the terms of the Asset 
       Purchase Agreement. The validity of that Agreement 
       was contingent on the approval of Chrysler. The Hands 
       assumed the risk and for whatever reason, the Hands 
       were not approved by Chrysler to obtain a sales and 
       service agreement. Consequently, any claims asserted 
       by the Hands that rely on the terms of the Agreement 




We agree. Crivelli offers no explanation why the 
Pennsylvania legislature would turn away from the common 
law principle of freedom of contract and impose a 
reasonableness standard on aspects of a private contract 
between the manufacturer and dealer that, like the exercise 
of a right of first refusal, presents little, if any, likelihood of 
harm to the dealer. 
 
Our conclusion that the Act did not limit a motor vehicle 
manufacturer's exercise of its contractual right offirst 
refusal is confirmed by the 1996 amendments to the Act. At 
that time, the Pennsylvania legislature added S 818.16, a 
new section titled "Manufacturer right of first refusal," 
which, for the first time, takes cognizance of a right of first 
refusal. That section provides: 
 
       A manufacturer or distributor shall be permitted to 
       enact a right of first refusal to acquire the new vehicle 
       dealer's assets or ownership in the event of a proposed 
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       change of all or substantially all ownership or transfer 
       of all or substantially all dealership assets if all of the 
       following requirements are met . . . ." 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, S 818.16 (1996) (emphasis added). 
There are four statutory prerequisites to the manufacturer's 
exercise of the right of first refusal. 
 
       (1) . . . the manufacturer . . . must notify the d ealer in 
       writing within [60 or 75 days]. 
 
       (2) . . . the dealer . . . [will] receiv[e] the same or greater 
       consideration as . . . contracted to receive in 
       connection with the proposed change of . . . ownership 
       . . . . 
 
       (3) The proposed change . . . does not involve . .  . a 
       designated family member or members . . . of the 
       dealer . . . or . . . a qualified manager . . .[who are 
       protected should the dealer seek to transfer to them].4 
 
       (4) The manufacturer or distributor agrees to pay the 
       reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney 
       fees . . . incurred by the proposed new owner and 
       transferee prior to the manufacturer's or distributor's 
       exercise of its right of first refusal in negotiating and 
       implementing the contract for the proposed change 
       . . . . 
 
Title 63, S 818.16. 
 
Crivelli argues that S 818.16 did not effect a repeal of 
S 818.9 and should not be used in interpreting the meaning 
of the prior provision. We share Crivelli's objection to 
placing undue emphasis on the 1996 amendments when 
interpreting the intent of the 1983 Pennsylvania legislature 
that enacted S 818.9, see United States v. United Mine 
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 282 (1947), and therefore 
agree that the subsequent addition of S 818.16 cannot 
provide controlling guidance in the interpretation of 
S 818.9. However, having already concluded that nothing in 
the Act as it stood at the time of the events required that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The right of first refusal in GM's agreement with Scheidmantel also 
had incorporated terms similar to those in subsections (2) and (3) above, 
later included in the amended statute. 
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the manufacturer provide a reasonable justification for its 
decision to exercise its right of first refusal, we note that 
the 1996 amendments reinforce that interpretation. 
 
The 1996 amendments are instructive regarding the 
scope of S 818.9(b)(3). Nothing in the language of S 818.16, 
which defines the circumstances under which a 
manufacturer may now exercise a right of first refusal, 
suggests that any other provision of the Act may further 
limit the ability of a manufacturer to exercise its right of 
first refusal. To the contrary, a persuasive inference can be 
drawn from the enactment of S 818.16(1) that the 1996 
Pennsylvania legislature did not intend S 818.9(b)(3) to 
govern rights of first refusal. 
 
One of the subsections dealing with the manufacturer's 
consent to a sale, S 818.9(b)(4), already required the 
manufacturer to respond in writing to a request for its 
consent to the sale of the franchise. However, S 818.16(1), 
dealing with the right of first refusal, also requires the 
manufacturer to notify the dealer in writing. That section 
would have been duplicative if, as Crivelli contends, a right 
of first refusal were considered a withholding of consent 
under the Act. This evidences that the interpretation 
Crivelli would have us adopt would conflict with the general 
instruction in Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act of 
1972 that "[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to 
give effect to all its provisions." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, 
S 1921(a). On the other hand, if, as GM contends, a right of 
first refusal was not a withholding of consent, the 
legislature could reasonably have believed that theS 818.16 
amendment was necessary to establish the restrictions 
governing a manufacturer's exercise of its right offirst 
refusal. 
 
Given the meaningful and clear dissimilarities between a 
consent requirement and a right of first refusal, we 
accordingly predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would hold that the exercise of a right of first refusal is not 
a withholding of consent.5 Therefore GM was not required 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court referred to In re Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 F.3d 
674 (3d Cir. 1994), a case that arose under the New Jersey Franchise 
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by S 818.9(b)(3) to justify its decision to the jury to enforce 
its contractual right of first refusal. It follows that the 
District Court erred as a matter of law in denying GM's 




Intentional Interference with a Contract 
 
Because Crivelli's jury verdict and judgment were 
premised on the Pennsylvania tort of intentional 
interference with a contractual relation as well as the Board 
of Vehicles Act, our decision that the statute cannot 
support the judgment requires us to determine whether the 
judgment can be sustained on the basis of the tort. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, the elements of a cause of 
action for intentional interference with a contractual 
relation, whether existing or prospective, are: 
 
       (1) the existence of a contractual, or prospective 
       contractual relation between the complainant and a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Practices Act (herein "FPA") not the Pennsylvania Act at issue here. The 
FPA required a franchisor -- after receiving a proposal from a current 
franchisee to transfer, assign, or sell a franchise to another person -- 
to 
either approve the proposal or notify the franchisee of its decision to 
disapprove, setting forth the "material reasons relating to the character, 
financial ability or business experience of the proposed transferee." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 56:10-6 (West 1989). GM exercised its contractual right of 
first approval when a bankrupt GM dealer sought its consent to transfer 
the dealership. The dealer and its proposed transferee filed suit against 
GM, alleging it acted unreasonably or in bad faith because it changed its 
reasons and the reasons given were not accurate. Relying on dictum in 
Simmons v. General Motors Corp., 435 A.2d 1167, 1177 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1981), we held that the FPA "impose[s] a requirement of 
reasonableness on a franchisor's decision to disapprove a transfer" and 
accordingly reversed the grant of summary judgment as the plaintiffs 
had presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness 
of GM's disapproval. Headquarters Dodge, 13 F.3d at 681. In light of the 
different statutes at issue, however, that case does not support the 
conclusion that the Pennsylvania Act imposes a requirement of 
reasonableness on GM's decision to exercise its right of first refusal, 
nor 
has Crivelli so argued on appeal. 
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       third party; (2) purposeful action on the part of the 
       defendant, specifically intended to harm the existing 
       relation, or to prevent a prospective relation from 
       occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on 
       the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of 
       actual legal damage as a result of the defendant's 
       conduct. 
 
Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 985 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (citations omitted). Pennsylvania has 
expressly adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
states that a necessary element of this tort is improper 
conduct by the alleged tortfeasor, here GM. See Adler, 
Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 
1183 (Pa. 1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts SS 766-67. 
 
The Restatement also sets forth the following factors to 
consider when determining whether the interference is 
improper: 
 
       (a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's 
       motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the 
       actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be 
       advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in 
       protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
       contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or 
       remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference 
       and (g) the relations between the parties. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 767. 
 
The general issue is "whether, upon a consideration of 
the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct 
should be permitted without liability, despite its effect of 
harm to another." Adler, 393 A.2d at 1184 n.17 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 767 cmt. b). According to 
one of the Restatement's comments, the "nature of the 
actor's conduct is a chief factor" in determining whether the 
conduct is improper. Restatement (Second) of TortsS 767 
cmt. c. It gives illustrative examples of improper conduct 
actions, such as threats of physical violence, fraudulent 
misrepresentations, threats of unmerited civil or criminal 
litigation, economic pressure, and unlawful conduct. See id. 
The conduct Crivelli attacks by its tort claim, GM's decision 
to exercise its right of first refusal, is not comparable to any 
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of those examples and, as we have just decided, violated no 
statute, regulation, or governing judicial decision. 
 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed the circumstances presented in this case, other 
courts have held that a company's exercise of a right of first 
refusal cannot ordinarily give rise to a claim of intentional 
interference with a contract. See Roberts, 643 A.2d at 960- 
62; Tynan, 591 A.2d at 1034; cf. Noller v. GMC Truck & 
Coach Div., General Motors Corp., 772 P.2d 271, 276-77 
(Kan. 1989) (manufacturer who agreed with franchisee not 
to withhold consent arbitrarily had no duty to prospective 
purchaser who was merely an incidental beneficiary of the 
agreement); Morse v. Ted Cadillac, Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 239, 
240 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (manufacturer did not interfere 
with prospective purchaser's contractual relations by 
refusing to enter into franchise agreement). 
 
Crivelli relies on our decision in Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. 
BMW of North Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1381-82 (3d Cir. 
1992), that the withholding of consent pursuant to a 
franchise agreement may constitute improper interference if 
the action violated the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act. 
However, the franchisor in that case did not assert a 
contractual right of first refusal whereas here GM asserted 
a bona fide right of first refusal designed to protect its 
interest in its franchise. Thus, GM's action falls within 
Restatement S 773, which provides, "[o]ne who, by asserting 
in good faith a legally protected interest of his own . . . 
intentionally causes a third person not to perform an 
existing contract or enter into a prospective contractual 
relation with another does not interfere improperly with the 
other's relation if the actor believes that his interest may 
otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the performance of 
the contract or transaction." Restatement (Second) of Torts 
S 773. 
 
While GM's exercise of its contractual right offirst refusal 
necessarily interfered with the purchase agreement between 
Crivelli and Scheidmantel, it does not subject GM to 
liability for interfering with their contract. See Ruffing v. 84 
Lumber Co., 600 A.2d 545, 548 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("[A]n 
actor is privileged to interfere with another's performance of 
a contract when: (1) the actor has a legally protected 
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interest; (2) he acts or threatens to act to protect the 
interest; and (3) the threat is to protect it by proper 
means.") (citing Gresh v. Potter McCune Co. , 344 A.2d 540, 
542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)). 
 
Crivelli "concedes that any franchisor has an interest in 
the identity of its franchisees . . . . [and] further concedes 
that absent the statute, GM would be free to exercise its 
right of first refusal . . . for any good faith reason it so 
desired." Appellee's Br. at 47. The only basis on which 
Crivelli defends its claim of intentional interference with a 
contract is its argument that after the enactment of the 
Board of Vehicles Act the "rules of the game" changed and 
"GM no longer had a privilege to act in an unfettered 
manner." Id. Because we have already decided that 
S 818.9(b)(3) of the Act does not apply to GM's exercise of 
its right of first refusal, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would conclude that, as a matter of law, the 
exercise of a right of first refusal by GM did not constitute 
an improper action within Pennsylvania's tort of intentional 
interference with a contractual relationship. Accordingly, 






Because of our holding that GM must prevail on Crivelli's 
statutory claim and intentional interference with a contract 
claim, we need not consider the various other issues GM 
raised on appeal. For the reasons set forth, we will reverse 
the District Court's denial of judgment to GM as a matter 
of law and will direct it to enter judgment for the defendant 
on both counts of the complaint. Each party to bear its own 
costs. 
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